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Satellite navigation systems provide continuous, timely, and accurate signals of location,
speed, and time to users all over the world. Although the running of these systems has
become highly automated, the human operator is still vital for its continued operation,
especially when certain equipment failures occur. In this paper, we examined 180
incidents of one particular type of equipment failure and the whole recovery process as
recorded in the log files from a ground control center of the Beidou satellite navigation
system. We extracted the information, including the technical description of the failure,
the time when the fault occurred, the full recovery time, and the demographic information
of the team members on the shift responsible for responding to the failure. We then
transformed these information into the cognitive complexity of the task, time of day,
shift handover period, and team skill composition. Multiple regression analysis showed
that task complexity and shift handover were key predictors of recovery time. Time
of day also influenced the recovery time, during midnight to 4 a.m., operators made
longer responses. We also found that the fault handling processes could be improved
if the team’s most adept member is more skillful at that role than in other teams. We
discussed the theoretical and practical implication of this study.
Keywords: satellite navigation system, fault handling, task complexity, time of day, shift handover, team skill level,
incident-based analysis
INTRODUCTION
Satellite navigation systems play an important role in modern society. For example, the well-
established US-owned Global Positioning System (GPS) provided $ 68.7 billion economic benefits
in 2013, making up 0.4% of U.S. GDP (Leveson, 2015). Satellite navigation systems consist of 1000s
of instruments, and each instrument has different functions. If a certain instrumental failure occurs,
the system may not be able to provide its service in a normal manner. In that case, quick recovery is
key for system effectiveness. Otherwise, it can result in serious disturbance to its users all over the
globe (e.g., the EU-owned GALILEO system suffered a mass outage on 12 July 2019 because of the
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Precise Time Facility fault, which took a week to recover).
Although automation has been widely introduced to current
satellite systems, remote human operation from a ground
control center is still crucial, especially in responding to certain
equipment failures. Operators are required to provide immediate
and correct responses to detect, diagnose and resolve the fault,
but their performance is heavily influenced by certain human
factor variables which are also important for human-computer
interface design, training, and management.
Human factors in the control of space-based systems were
studied many years ago. For example, Kuhr and Tobias
(1974) studied human factors engineering in the design of a
satellite communication system. They provided the principles
and constraints of the design and corresponding verifications
in some control terminals. To meet the requirement of
advanced automation, human factors were introduced to design
NASA’s near-earth satellite control center (Mitchell, 1982; Van
Balen and Mitchell, 1983). They provided a data-gathering
method and introduced a methodology for human factors
analysis and design. In an empirical study, Charlton (1992)
investigated how self-reported human factor variables (e.g.,
usefulness of documentation, display layout, workload, noise
level, fatigue, etc.) could influence the operation time in space
control centers. Neville et al. (2003) studied the design of
a toolset for operators in changing satellite operations. They
described work-centered user interfaces design principles and
provided a satellite viewing tool as an example. However,
these studies are quite old, and their conclusions were based
on a pre-operation evaluation, rather than on empirical
operational data.
Although direct evidence on factors that influence the
operation of this special task is limited, studies on other process
control operations with similar working requirements can
provide valuable information. The fault diagnosis and resolution
process has been studied intensively in the nuclear power plant,
air traffic control (Langer and Braithwaite, 2016; Trapsilawati
et al., 2016; Borst et al., 2017), submarine (Roberts et al., 2017),
and many other backgrounds (Vicente et al., 2004; Wickens
et al., 2009; Sebok and Wickens, 2016). Operator performance
of safety-critical and highly automated environments monitoring
has also been studied (Funke et al., 2016; Cymek, 2018).
Previous studies have shown that several key factors can influence
operator performance during fault handling, including task
complexity (Liu and Li, 2012), positional knowledge and skill
(Littlepage et al., 2016), and environmental stress (Martin et al.,
2019), etc. However, no direct empirical research has been
reported on the fault handling process of satellite control.
To fill these research gaps, we examined how task, person
and environmental characteristics jointly influenced the fault
handling process of the satellite navigation system based on
actual event data. In the following paragraphs, we described the
operation requirements and processes of the Beidou Navigation
Satellite System; then, we reviewed the literature on important
factors that might influence the process by considering studies
from other process-control operations; finally, we provided a
research scheme on how to test the influence of each factor using
actual event records.
The System Control and a Typical Fault
Handling Process of Beidou Navigation
Satellite System
Beidou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) is one of the four
navigation systems in the world, the other three are GPS of
the United States, GLONASS of Russia and GALILEO of the
European Union. Constructed and operated by China, BDS
provides all-time, all-weather and high-accuracy positioning,
navigation, and timing services to global users.
The operational control system of BDS is composed of
two independent departments, navigation service control center
(NSCC) and satellite platform control center (SPCC). The two
departments account for different functions. The major work of
NSCC operators is to monitor the functioning of the navigational
information system installed on the satellite (can be considered
as an application software system). The operators at SPCC, on
the other hand, are controlling all on-board instruments and the
operating system of the satellites.
In the NSCC, operators work in teams to monitor the
navigational information system on a 24-h basis, and one of
their major tasks is to detect, diagnose, and resolve possible
instrument/system failures. When any on-board equipment
failure occurs, the system will alarm, the operator team then
detects the alarm and makes a preliminary diagnosis (stage 1).
If they find it is a satellite equipment failure, they will request
SPCC to conduct the on-board checking and equipment recovery
(stage 2). After the on-board equipment is recovered, the NSCC
will receive the feedback from the SPCC and start to make a
series of operations to re-initiate the navigational information
system (stage 3). The whole instrument failure handling process
ends when the navigation signal received from satellite returns
to normal. This process is illustrated in Figure 1. During the
whole process, all the important time points are recorded, which
provided valuable information on task completion times of all
three stages (T1, T2, and T3) for human factor researchers.
Key Human Factors That May Influence
the Recovery Process of the Satellite
Navigation System
Given that the equipment failure incidents analyzed in this paper
were all resolved, we took the task completion time as the
most important evaluation index of the handling process. The
key human factors can impact on either the task requirements
or the operator teams’ capacity, and the completion time may
be prolonged when their capacity or capability fails to meet
the requirments.
Task Complexity
Task complexity is an intrinsic task characteristic which
evaluates the structure and requirement of a task (Wood,
1986; Gonzalez et al., 2005; Liu and Li, 2012). From an
objective perspective, task complexity is often operationalized
using standard operating procedures, necessary coordination
loops, and dynamic information processing (Wood, 1986). This
objective task complexity is independent of task executors.
Although increased task complexity may sometimes increase
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FIGURE 1 | The four critical events (the circles) and the three stages of operations of an instrument failure handling process.
operator performance when the baseline tasks are too simple
and boring (Pepinsky et al., 1960; Wood, 1986; Tan et al.,
2002), higher task complexity is often related to lower operator
performance (Liu and Li, 2011). This negative effect is
particularly common for failure diagnosis and resolution in
a highly dynamic and complex automated systems (Mumaw
et al., 2000; Vicente et al., 2001). For example, Molloy and
Parasuraman (1996) found that in a simulated flight task,
participants performed worse in detecting the failures when the
task was more complex. Similarly, Mumaw et al. (2000) found
that more complex situations could increase the difficulty to
detect and resolve abnormal events in nuclear power plants.
In our study, we focus on operators’ performance in fault
diagnosis and resolution for the highly dynamic and complex
Beidou satellite navigation system. Task complexity would
be determined by system and fault characteristics regardless
of operators’ characteristics. Conflicts between high cognitive
complexity and limited information processing ability may lead
to longer operating times. Therefore, we assumed that there
is a positive relationship between task complexity and task
completion time (hypothesis H1).
Shift Handover
Shift handover occurs when two shifts rotate. The goal of shift
handover is to effectively communicate task-related information
across shifts, thereby guaranteeing “continuity of safe and
effective working” (Brazier and Sedgwick, 2011). However, there
is often insufficient or erroneous communication during this
period, which may lead to near-misses or even accidents.
Accident investigations found that handover problems were
among the root causes of many critical events. For example,
the incomplete handover of fault handling between two shifts
of the control room was a leading cause behind the Piper
Alpha incident (Kontogiannis et al., 2000). Doytchev and Szwillus
(2009) also pointed out that incomplete information handover
was an important reason for a basement flood accident of a
nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. Researchers using a larger
data set of incidents also found a link between shift handover
and accidents. For example, deficient handover can increase
transmission errors and related accidents in the offshore oil
industry (Gordon, 1998). Similarly, incomplete or non-handover
can result in patient safety issues in medical settings (Pezzolesi
et al., 2010, 2012; Riesenberg, 2012). Siemsen et al. (2012) also
found evidence that shift handover is one of the factors affecting
task performance in nuclear power plants control rooms.
Through the literature review, it is clear that insufficient
handover may lead to negative effects on tasks. In practical
terms, the incoming team may not have a comprehensive
grasp of the system state, resulting in failure to complete or
repetition of certain steps during the fault handling process, thus
increasing the processing time. Indeed, even if the handover is
sufficient, making a handover itself can increase the cognitive
and communicative burden on both shifts during the handover
period, which may occupy the limited cognitive resource
originally assigned to the task. In this way, we proposed that when
an unexpected fault occurs during the shift handover, the fault
handling process might be affected, and the task completion time
would be prolonged (H2).
Time of Day
Because many human psychological processes and mental
functions are influenced by circadian rhythms (Folkard, 1983;
Campbell, 1992), task performance of the satellite fault handling
process can also be affected by the time of day.
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Circadian rhythms are changes in physical and mental
functions, from nervous system activity to hormone production,
following a 24-h cycle. Although these rhythms vary from
individual to individual, for most people, the lowest physiological
activity occurs around 4:00 to 6:00 a.m. (Monk et al., 1997). Task
performance is also influenced by these rhythms. Generally, the
highest performance level occurs in the morning, and the lowest
occurs from midnight to 6 a.m., which is related to the law of
human body temperature cycle (Colquhoun, 1972; Dongen and
Dinges, 2000).
In the fault handling task of the satellite navigation system
studied in this paper, the fault can occur at any time of day, in
this way, providing a natural experiment to examine whether the
time of day can influence the task performance of operators. It
was assumed that the time of day might affect the task completion
time of the fault handling process (hypothesis H3).
Team Skill Composition
Since the satellite control task is performed by operator teams, the
characteristics of the team can also play a role in influencing the
performance. In the IMOI model that guides most team research,
team composition, especially the composition of team members’
capabilities, is an important input variable (Ilgen et al., 2005;
Mathieu et al., 2013). It is found that the ability level, competence,
and mental model of team members have a significant impact on
team performance (Kearney et al., 2009).
To quantify team composition, the average level is mostly
used. For example, Resick et al. (2010) found that the averaged
team cognitive ability was most predictive of team performance.
Zhang et al. (2013) also found that the average mental ability
score of control room operators in nuclear power plants was
significantly related to team performance. Given most team
tasks require a collaboration of all team members, it is not
surprising that the mean skill level, which best reflects the team
as a whole, can have the largest effect. In certain teams with
specific team structure and task requirement, however, other
quantification methods (e.g., the highest value) can also predict
team performance (Devine and Philips, 2001). For example, if
the team task has a clear division of labor and the fulfillment
of the task relies heavily on the expertise possessed by the most
specialized team members, then the highest skill level of the team
might also be related to the team performance (Bell, 2007).
In handling the failure of a satellite navigation system,
operators in a team have to work closely with each other.
Meanwhile, since the work is highly specialized, they also have a
clear division of labor, and each member must use their expertise
to handle relevant sub-tasks when needed. In this way, both the
averaged team skill level and the highest skill level can influence
team performance. As a result, we made the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis H4-a: The average team skill level has a positive
impact on task performance;
Hypothesis H4-b: The highest team skill level has a positive
impact on task performance.
The Present Study
In this study, we would fully utilize actual event log records to
research the failure process of satellite navigation instrument,
hoping to examine how task complexity, shift handover, time
of day, and team skill composition jointly influence instrument
failure recovery process. While the detailed description could be
found in the method section, two important aspects must be
addressed here, as they were related to the general expectations of
our research. First, we would analyze the task completion times at
two different operation centers (T1 and T3 at NSCC, T2 at SPCC),
but we only collected the shift schedule and team composition
information from NSCC, so these two factors would be more
likely to exert influence on T1 and T3. Second, the information
was collected from actual log records which were written by the
operators and only the minute level information was recorded, so
the reliability of the models would be undermined when the total
lengths of the time interval were shorter (T1).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The System
The task of the research is defined as diagnosing and processing
satellite navigation instrument failure. One certain category of
events, Instrument N1 failure, was extracted and analyzed in this
study. Satellite navigation instrument failure usually results in
unavailability of the satellite, which may reduce the navigation
precision of users. Accordingly, a quick solution for instrument
failure is very important for the navigation satellite system.
Instrument N failure was chosen in our study for two reasons.
First, this failure is one of the typical failures of a satellite
navigation system. According to the event log of the system,
Instrument N failure is responsible for about 18.1% of all failures
as the largest category of all. Second, its diagnosis and recovery
process follows a clear hierarchy. When Instrument N failure
occurs, operators perform a diagnosis and a series of fault
handling. The whole process of fault handling is divided into
two parts, on-board operation and service control operation. On-
board operation is referring to the on-board functional recovery,
including diagnosis of the failure and corresponding operations,
while service control operation is referring to the navigation
business recovery, including instrument operating, information
creating, and feedback confirming. Most of the operational steps
are executed sequentially.
The Instrument N involves two modules: module A and
module B. As module A is tightly associated with the navigation
precision of users, we chose the module A failure as the target of
our research. We have taken an approach of using actual data in
the course of operation and maintenance of the NSCC. The task
of the research was defined as diagnosing and disposing of the
Instrument N failure.
Data
We were provided with actual data from the NSCC, which
is responsible for the management of BDS ground station.
1For confidential reasons, the actual name of the Instrument N was not revealed.
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Such data included properties of the fault handling process.
Failures occurred randomly and the operators on duty recorded
the key information. We were provided with 180 Instrument
N fault handling records, from a total of 635 records over
16 months of operation, which included failure time, failure
circumstances, length of handling time, and operator team
information. The failure circumstances contained failure module
and satellite visibility information (Chen et al., 2016). Length of
handling time contained judgment time (T1), satellite platform
diagnosis and recovery time (T2) and navigation service system
re-initiation time (T3).
Further analysis showed that these kind of events could
happen at any time, regardless of the time of a day, or any
particular previous operation. In this way, it provided a very good
natural experiment to test our key hypotheses.
Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables were used. Judgment time (T1) is
defined as the length of time for the operators of NSCC to make
a quick judgment to locate the failure to be Instrument N on the
satellite (M = 3.02 min, SD = 2.55). Satellite platform diagnosis
and recovery time (T2) is defined as the length of time used by the
SPCC operators to diagnose and recover the on-board equipment
(M = 22.59 min, SD = 18.66). Navigation service system re-
initiation time (T3) is defined as the length of time used by NSCC
operators to make a series of operations to recover the navigation
information system (M = 52.71 min, SD = 29.97). The beginning
and the end of each period were determined using the four events
illustrated in Figure 1. To reiterate, the entries in the log files (for
example, entry 1: alarm detected at 4:43 a.m.; entry 2: request
send to SPCC at 4: 47 a.m.) were all written by the operators
and they only recorded minute level information, so the time
interval (in this example, T1 = 4:47 a.m.- 4:43 a.m. = 4 min)
were only accurate to minute. While this measurement error is
mostly random which can be reduced by a large sample, it is
worth noting that its influence might be more severe for models
in predicting T1, as compared with T2 and T3, since the former
is much shorter.
Independent Variables
We totally defined 15 independent variables based on the four
factors, task complexity, time of day, shift handover, and team
skill level, that were expected to affect the performance.
Task Complexity
The evaluation of task complexity was based on the post hoc
analysis of the actual equipment conditions. Based on expert
interview and task analysis, task complexity was determined
by two objective factors: whether the two sub-modules in the
instrument failed simultaneously and whether the satellite was
observable by the Beijing ground station accessing the satellite
signal directly, rather than from other ground stations (Wang
et al., 2019). In the Instrument N failure incidents, two sub-
modules can fail simultaneously, and the diagnosis and recovery
becomes more difficult under that circumstance. Besides, when
the satellite is invisible, the operators need to adopt more
procedural steps, including using information from other ground
stations and satellite-satellite communication, to diagnose the
failure. Therefore, task complexity increases. According to the
factors above, task complexity is divided into three levels.
Definition of task complexity is detailed:
Level 1: only one module fails, and the satellite is within direct
observable range.
Level 2: both modules fail, while the satellite is within direct
observable range.
or: only one module fails, and the satellite is outside
direct observable range.
Level 3: both modules fail, and the satellite is outside direct
observable range.
Time of Day
A series of dummy variables were created to account for the
time of day in the regression analysis to rule out certain non-
linear relationships. In this study, 12 2-h periods were used. The
first interval is 0:00–2:00, and the 12th is 22:00–24:00. We used
the interval 8:00–10:00 as the reference interval because both T2
and T3 were the shortest in that period. Therefore, 11 dummy
variables were created to represent this factor.
Shift Handover Period
The shift handover period was defined as “1” if it fell in the
specified period (30 min before or after the shift handover time at
8:30 and 16:30, that is, 8:00–9:00 and 16:00–17:00, respectively)
and as “0” if it was another time. To note, since only the shift
schedule of the NSCC operators were available, the shift handover
variable was more likely to be predictive T1 and T3, rather than
T2 (which was performed by SPCC operators).
Team Skill Composition
First, the skill levels of three NSCC operators who were on-site
during the incident were extracted. The data in the event log
was recorded strictly according to the duty group at the time
of failure. Their relative expertise in handling the Instrument
N failure was evaluated on a 1 (just qualified) to 3 (very
competent) scale given their experience and majored discipline
by three experts and managers, and the inter-rater reliability of
the evaluation was 0.94. Second, the maximum skill level and
average skill level were defined as two independent variables and
computed for each event. To note, since only the information of
the NSCC operators were available, the skill level variables were
more likely to be predictive T1 and T3, rather than T2 (which was
performed by SPCC operators).
In addition to being on duty in the control room, operators
were also engaged in daily work during their daily working hours,
such as the maintenance, modification, and upgrading of the
system. Daily work is classified into six majors: satellite-ground
collaboration, measurement and communication, information
processing, time unification, performance monitoring, planning
and control. The six majors are divided into three levels according
to the degree of correlation with equipment N failure.
Level 1: time unification.
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Level 2: measurement and communication, information
processing.
Level 3: satellite-ground collaboration, performance
monitoring, planning, and control.
RESULTS
Regression Analysis
We conducted a series of hierarchical regression analyses to
predict all three times (T1, T2, and T3) using task complexity,
time of day, shift handover period, and team skill level measures.
To note, we only had the shift handover period and the teamskill
level measures for the NSCC operators. However, we kept all
these variables in the regression models to predict both NSCC
operation (T1 and T3) and SPCC operation (T2) for two reasons.
First, the operation of the NSCC operators may have certain after
effects on the SPCC operators’ work. In this way, controlling for
certain NSCC properties can rule out alternative explanations.
Second, it is easy to compare the variable contributions across
different models by using the same independent variables. The
results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 1.
In predicting T1, the whole model was significant, and all
variables accounted for 23% of the total variance of this initial
TABLE 1 | The regression analyses of all three time measures.
Independent
variables
T1 (Judgment of
navigation
service failure,
NSCC)
T2 (Satellite
platform
diagnosis and
recovery, SPCC)
T3 (Navigation
service system
re-initiation,
NSCC)
(1) Task complexity 0.34*** 0.46*** 0.33***
(2) Shift handover
period (NSCC)+
0.02 0.23 0.35***
(3) Average team
skill level (NSCC)
0.09 −0.08 −0.08
(4) Highest team
skill level (NSCC)
−0.27** 0.02 −0.32***
Time of day
(5) 0:00–2:00 0.02 0.27* 0.15
(6) 2:00–4:00 −0.04 0.30* 0.09
(7) 4:00–6:00 −0.05 0.18 0.14
(8) 6:00–8:00 −0.11 0.14 0.11
(9) 8:00–10:00++ — — —
(10) 10:00–12:00 −0.14 0.08 0.13
(11) 12:00–14:00 0.00 0.03 0.11
(12) 14:00–16:00 −0.15 0.12 0.06
(13) 16:00–18:00 −0.15 0.04 0.08
(14) 18:00–20:00 0.08 0.18 0.15
(15) 20:00–22:00 −0.13 0.03 0.03
(16) 22:00–24:00 −0.06 0.04 0.12
R2 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.27***
F 2.933 5.024 3.341
*Significant at 0.05 level, **Significant at 0.01 level, ***Significant at 0.001 level.
+Shift handover Period was coded as 1 when the time is 30 min within shift
handover, as 0 if it is out of this period; ++reference category.
judgment time. Task complexity (β = 0.34, p < 0.001) and the
highest team skill level (β = −0.27, p < 0.01) turned out to be
significant predictors. More time was spent on stage 1 if the task
was more complex and the skill of the most adept operator in
the team was lower.
In predicting T2, the whole model was significant, and all
variables accounted for 35% of the total variance of the satellite
platform diagnosis and recovery time. Task complexity (β = 0.46,
p < 0.001), time periods 0:00–2:00 (β = −0.27, p < 0.01) and
2:00–4:00 (β = −0.30, p < 0.01) turned out to be significant
predictors. More time was spent on stage 2 if the task was more
complex and the time was between midnight and 4 a.m.
In predicting T3, the whole model was significant, and all
variables accounted for 27% of the total variance. Task complexity
(β = 0.33, p < 0.001), the shift handover period (β = 0.35,
p < 0.001) and the highest team skill level (β =−0.32, p < 0.001)
turned out to be significant predictors. More time was spent on
stage 3 if the task was more complex, the incidents happened
during the shift handover period, and the skill of the most adept
operator in the team was lower.
DISCUSSION
This study sought to examine how task, environment, and
team characteristics jointly influence the system recovering
process after equipment failure of the Beidou satellite navigation
system using real event records. Three stages (judgment of
navigation service failure, satellite platform diagnosis and
recovery and navigation service re-initiation) were identified,
and their execution time was analyzed. Several findings are
worth discussion.
Task Complexity Impacted to Operator’s
Response Time
The results demonstrated that task complexity turned out to
be the most significant predictor of the task completion time
of all three stages. This is not surprising given the fact that
the difficulty to use the signal directly and the numbers of
failed modules are linked closely with both mental (diagnosis)
and physical (execution) operations. When the satellite is out
of direct signal receiving areas, operators need to use multiple
sources of information to figure out its current situation. Also, as
compared with the situation in which only one module fails, more
operations are needed when two modules fail. It is interesting that
the relationship between task complexity and satellite platform
recovering time (T2, β = 0.46, p < 0.000) was closer as compared
to its relationships with navigation service failure diagnosis time
(T1, β = 0.34, p < 0.001) and navigation service system re-
initiation time (T3, β = 0.33, p < 0.001). To note, in performing
the first and the final stages of operation, operators only need to
make a one-way communication with the satellite, following a
single thread without alternative operations, i.e., either using the
data sent from the satellite (the first stage) or issuing a command
to the satellite (the final stage). Even the steps to confirm whether
the navigation signal is normal are routine operations. However,
in performing the second stage of operation, controllers (at
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another center) are more involved with two-way communication:
they have to send commands to the satellite to shut down or
restart certain equipment that may account for the problem
and wait for the responses from the satellite to see whether it
works. This process may repeat back and forth several times
until they successfully locate the real problem and find ways
to handle it. In this way, the increase in task complexity may
make this process more complicated as it requires relatively more
operational steps.
The Failures Near Shifting Time Require
Longer Re-initiate Time
The time to re-initiate the navigation service system (T3)
was prolonged when the event happened during the shift
handover period. In this case, the two shifts have much
information to transfer during the handover, which may affect
the operation of the third stage. However, the initial judgment
time (T1) was not influenced by this variable. The reason
might be that since the first stage of operation requires a
fast response which generally lasts for quite a short period
of time (M = 3.02 min, SD = 2.55), even if there are many
items to be included in the handover, operators may prioritize
dealing with this short but urgent task. However, when it
requires a long-term operation such as the third stage work
(M = 52.71 min, SD = 29.97), operators in a handover period
may not be able to invest all their resources to deal with such
operation. Since the second stage of the operation is performed
by operators at another center whose shift handover period
was not revealed, it is not surprising that this variable did
not influence T2.
Circadian Impacted to Human
Performance
The time of day an event occurred had an influence on T2,
but not on T1 and T3. The satellite platform recovery time
was significantly longer when the incidents happened between
0:00 and 4:00, which is in accordance with previous findings
that people have lowest physiological arousal and mental and
physical readiness at this time (Colquhoun, 1972). The reasons
why T1 and T3 were not influenced by time of day can be
many. First, the initial diagnosis can be made very fast after
the very loud alert signal, which may undermine the effects of
reduced arousal, so the completion time would not be influenced
by this variable. For the operators doing the third stage task
(system reinitiating), since they have been awakened previously,
they can get themselves prepared when waiting for the second
stage to be finished. In this period, they can arrange their time
to take some rest or drink coffee so they can get vitalized.
As a result, although this stage lasts quite long, it is also not
influenced by time of day.
The Formation of Team Experience
Influenced Diagnosis
The highest level of team expertise had a significant effect on
T1 and T3. This result indicates that the performance of a
team is significantly influenced by the team member with the
most professional background. Nevertheless, the average team
skill level was not found to have any significant influences. This
finding can be explained in two different ways. First, it is possible
that the task allocation in the satellite control center is not very
interdependent and the work of any specific operation is only
assigned to the operator who has the most relevant skill. In this
way, if he/she fails, the whole process can be undermined. Second,
it is also possible that even if the team members coordinate
intensively in this process, the knowledge and skills to perform
the diagnosis and operation are not additive. All operators will
follow the instructions of the most adept operators in their shift
team, and his/her failure may result in prolonged reaction time
of the whole team. Since we did not collect the team composition
data from the SPCC, it is not surprising that the team skill
levels did not influence on T2 (the On-board Diagnosis Time
performed by SPCC operators).
Limitations
Several limitations must be mentioned before concluding. In
the first place, the event log file we used in this study, albeit
very real, had certain drawbacks. For example, since all the
times were recorded only down to minute (also see the method
section), the regression model for T1 might be comparatively
less reliable than the models established for T2 and T3 because
the measurement error occupies a larger ratio for the shorter
time intervals. Future studies may benefit from using a more
accurate recording system. Second, we only made analyses based
on the most common incidents (the failure of Instrument N).
Although other types of failure have a lot in common with the
incidents we analyzed, it can be further explored in future studies
whether the human factor variables identified in this study can be
generalized to the responses to other types of incidents. Besides,
we only collected the data from the NSCC but failed to collect
the team composition and the shift schedule of SPCC operators.
Although we correctly found T2 (the time performed by the
SPCC operators) could not be predicted by the team composition
and the shift schedule of NSCC operators, more explanatory
power can be added if we could use more relevant information
from the SPCC operators.
CONCLUSION
This study attempts to provide an initial understanding of how
task, environmental, and team characteristics jointly influence
the fault handling process of the Beidou satellite navigation
system. This study made an analysis based on real incident
records. We found many human factor variables predictive
of the completion time for an instrument failure recovery,
which could explain a certain amount of variance (23–35%).
These findings offer some implications for the Beidou satellite
navigation system. Above all, since task complexity is the
strongest predictor of the fault handling time, efforts should
be paid to lower it in multiple aspects, such as instrument
optimization, operation simplification, and interface usability.
Second, the SPCC is suggested to attach more importance to
the time period 0:00–4:00, during which the satellite platform
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recovery time is prolonged. A possible solution is to add
operators, especially those energetic at night. Though certain
effects of other environment and team characteristics have not
been confirmed for the SPCC, it can be pursued further in
the future. Furthermore, given the significance of the team’s
highest skill level for the recovery process, making sure there
is at least one competent operator in each team will be helpful.
For researchers, future studies may benefit from using a more
accurate recording system of both the events and the individuals.
For practitioners, it is worth thinking whether the process can
be improved by removing certain obstacles that may undermine
human performance.
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